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NOTE
FUNDING INDIANA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
A QUESTION OF EQUAL AND
ADEQUATE EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
It will be a great day when the Schools get all the money they need
and the air force has to hold a bake sale to buy a bomber.'
INTRODUCTION
Indiana public schools must provide equal and adequate educational
opportunity for all the state's children,2 yet Indiana schools face a funding
crisis. Indiana has traditionally funded public education at a level below the
national average, and the funding gap between Indiana and the national average
continues to grow.3 The educational performance of Indiana students also ranks
below the national average, despite recent efforts to improve Indiana schools. 4
Furthermore, Indiana's funding formula for public education creates significant
disparities in the ability of individual school districts to meet student needs.
5
The problem of inadequate and unequal school funding is not unique to
Indiana. Since 1973,6 school officials, students, parents, and taxpayers in over
twenty states have vented their frustrations over insufficient school funding by
challenging state funding formulas on state constitutional grounds. Recently,
Indiana's funding formula for public schools has been challenged in state court
as violative of the Indiana Constitution.8
This note argues that Indiana's funding formula must be challenged under
the Indiana Constitution's education clause in order to ensure that all Indiana
1. (Sentiment printed on a tee shirt worn by a school board member at an Indiana School Board
Association legislative dinner. Fall, 1989).
2. See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 66-102 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
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children are provided with equal and adequate educational opportunity. Section
I will give a brief overview of the national context of public school funding,9
including the funding schemes of various states,'" the problems school districts
face because of specific funding mechanisms," and legal challenges that have
been brought against various state funding formulas under state constitution
equal protection and education clauses.'2 Section II will explore how Indiana
funds its public schools 3 and the problems created by Indiana's current funding
formula, both in terms of disparities and inadequacies. 4 In addition, section
II will discuss the pending court challenge to Indiana's public education funding
formula. 5
Section III will closely examine strategies for a constitutional challenge to
Indiana's funding formula.' 6  This section will initially discuss the
shortcomings of an Indiana equal protection approach 7 and will then analyze
the advantages of a challenge to the funding formula based on the Indiana
Constitution education clause.' After interpreting the Indiana education
clause, this section will argue that the education clause's directive to the Indiana
General Assembly to provide for an educated citizenry creates a constitutional
mandate for equal and adequate 9 educational opportunity. ' In conclusion,
9. See infra notes 22-53 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 66-102 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 105-29 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 130-46 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 157-253 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 157-83 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 184-253 and accompanying text.
19. The terms "equal" and "adequate" will be used throughout this note to describe two
desirable attributes of educational funding and opportunity. Equal funding refers not to identical
funding but to funding that achieves relative parity among school districts by recognizing districts'
special needs. See T. JONES, INTRODUCTION TO SCHOOL FINANCE 163-64 (1985) (discussing
replacement of strict equal spending per pupil with more flexible approach of "equal educational
opportunity" which takes into account relevant differences among student needs as well as
differences in school district costs due to size, geographic location and social characteristics). For
discussion of the shift in the educational agenda from equity in funding to quality of educational
opportunity, see Colvin, School Finance: Equity Concerns in an Age of Reforms, EDUC.
RESEARCHER 11 (Jan.-Feb. 1989); Berne, Equity Issues in School Finance, 14 J. EDUC. FINANCE
159 (1988). Adequate funding is funding sufficient to meet specified purposes. See infra note 100
and accompanying text. See generally Ward, Remedies in School Finance Equity Litigation, 36
WEST EDUC. L. REP. 1, 5-6 (1987).
The relationship between spending and quality of education is the subject of considerable
debate, the consideration of which is beyond the scope of this note. This note presumes a positive
correlation between funding levels and opportunity, a presumption which has been accepted in
various school litigation cases. See infra note 46. See also R. Lehnen, Public Education in the
American States and the Development of Human Capital (May 1989) (unpublished paper presented
to Regional Development Administration Conference). For a contrary view, see Perelman, The
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this note will argue that a challenge to Indiana's funding formula must be based
on this note's interpretation of the education clause of the Indiana Constitution
in order to ensure that Indiana schools have sufficient funds to meet the needs
of all Indiana children.2'
I. BACKGROUND--THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Public School Funding in the United States
Since responsibility for education is one of the powers reserved to the states
under the tenth amendment of the United States Constitution, public school
financing is usually controlled by state legislatures, subject only to restrictions
imposed by state constitutions. A state legislature's power to control public
education includes the authority to raise revenue for education through public
taxation.2' State funding schemes vary from state to state.' A legislature
may support the public schools of the state by a state-wide tax26 or delegate to
'Acanoia' Deception, HUDSON INST. BRIEFING PAPER (May 1990); Hanushet, The Economics of
Schooling, 24 J. ECON. LIT. 1141 (1986).
20. See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 232-53 and accompanying text.
22. By omission from the United States Constitution, education is a state power. E. GEE & D.
SPERRY, EDUCATION LAW AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS S-21 (1978). This section is meant to serve
as a brief introduction to school finance. For a general discussion of school finance, see E. GEE &
D. SPERRY, supra, at S-20 to S-30; T. JONES, supra note 19.
23. E. GEE & D. SPERRY, supra note 22, at S-21. All state constitutions contain education
clauses, which set out state legislative responsibilities as to public education. See infra notes 90-97
and accompanying text.
24. E. GEE & D. SPERRY, supra note 22, at S-21. The state may delegate to local school
districts the power to raise revenue for public schools through local taxes, but such funds remain
state not local funds, subject to state control. Local school districts have no inherent power to levy
taxes. Id. See also Robinson v. Schenk, 102 Ind. 307, 318, 1 N.E. 698, 705 (1885) (The
legislature may in its discretion support schools through a general levy or through local taxation, but
the duty to provide for public education remains that of the legislature.).
25. See infra notes 28-35.
26. See E. GEE & D. SPERRY, supra note 22, at S-22 (State revenue comes from several tax
sources, including personal income tax, sales tax, and inheritance and gift tax.).
At this point a preliminary definition of tax terms to be used in this note is useful.
Assessed Valuation: The total dollar value assigned to real property subject to taxation. The taxable
valuation is generally a percentage of the fair market value of the property.
Property Tax Levy: The dollar amount of taxes collected.
Property Tax Rate: A statement in dollars and cents, expressed per each hundred dollars of assessed
valuation that will yield a specified amount of money from property taxes. For instance, a tax rate
of $1.00 in a community with an assessed valuation of five million dollars will yield a levy of fifty
thousand dollars.
Revenue Receipt: Money received by a school district from state and local levies. INDIANA FARM
BUREAU, SCHOOL STATISTICAL REPORT 19-20 (1990) [hereinafter INDIANA FARM BUREAU].
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local districts the power to raise the necessary revenue.' State funding
schemes generally rely on a mix of state and local revenue, with most of the
funding coming from the state.' The local revenue portion comes primarily
from property taxes.29
State revenues are distributed to local districts through various
mechanisms." State aid may come in the form of a flat grant,3 a foundation
grant, 32 or a percentage equalizing grant. 33  Any individual state's funding
formula might consist of a mixture of these various mechanisms.' State
formulas may be very complex, providing percentage increases based on varying
local and state factors and restraining the amount local districts might raise to
supplement state revenue. 35 Despite the range of funding alternatives available,
state funding schemes often fail to meet state educational needs.
B. General Problems with State Funding Schemes
The number of challenges to state funding formulas evidences problems in
27. See supra note 24.
28. The local share of tax support has declined from 80% in the 1920's to 45% in the mid-
1980's, while the state share has increased. T. JONES, supra note 19, at 15. In Indiana, the state
provides approximately 63 % of school district revenue. INDIANA FARM BUREAU, supra note 26,
at 18. In some states, however, the state share can be as low as 10%. T. JONES, supra note 19,
at 15.
29. See T. JONES, supra note 19, at 73. See also INDIANA FARM BUREAU, supra note 26, at
17.
30. For a full discussion of school funding mechanisms, see T. JONES, supra note 19, at 95-
139.
31. A flat grant is state aid based upon a fixed unit, such as the number of pupils in a school
district. T. JONES, supra note 19, at 100-02.
32. A foundation plan sets minimum local property tax rates and minimum spending levels for
each school district. State aid to any school district is equal to the difference between the minimum
amount a district should be spending and the minimum local revenue. T. JONES, supra note 19, at
105-12.
33. An equalizing grant directs state resources toward poorer school districts. E. GEE & D.
SPERRY, supra note 22, at S-24.
34. See, e.g., infra notes 105-27 and accompanying text (Indiana's formula consists of
combination of flat grant, foundation program and equalizing factor.). In addition, the state may
provide categorical grants, money earmarked for specific programs, such as Indiana's Prime Time
Program, which provides state funds to schools reducing the sizes of primary grade classrooms.
INDIANA FARM BUREAU, supra note 26, at 24-25.
35. The legislature also makes adjustments to the funding scheme, such as providing a
percentage of new state money each year to accommodate rising cost of living expenses, and
restricting the minimum or maximum amounts of local revenue a local district is allowed to raise.
See R. LEHNEN & C. JOHNSON, FINANCING INDIANA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
PAST AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 11-14 (1984).
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public school funding schemes.3 State funding formulas may not meet the
needs of local districts in an equal manner" and may be generally inadequate
to meet the educational needs of the state.3 When state revenues are
insufficient, the local district usually must rely on "local effort" 39 and raise
additional revenue by increasing local property taxes.'
Reliance on local property taxes creates significant problems in funding
equality.4' All districts are not equally able to supplement inadequate state
revenues. Because property taxes are based on local assessed valuations,42 a
district with a high assessed valuation is able to raise more local revenue with
a smaller tax hike than can a district with a low assessed valuation.43 The
property-poor district needs a much higher tax rate in order to raise the same
number of dollars as the richer district." Depending on the assessed
36. A full discussion of the many challenges to state funding schemes is beyond the scope of
this note. For a survey of school finance litigation, see Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis
of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639
(1989).
37. See, e.g., Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (State
educational funding formula struck down because formula created spending per student differences
from $2,112 to $19,333).
38. See, e.g., Seattle School Dist. No. 1 of King City v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71
(1978) (State educational funding formula struck down because formula fails to make ample
provision for the basic education of the state's children).
39. "Local effort" is a phrase that refers to revenue raised by local property taxes. T. JONES,
supra note 19, at 146-47.
40. See, e.g., Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 392 (State foundation program does not cover even
the cost of meeting state-mandated minimum requirements and local districts must make up
difference with local funds. State funding scheme struck down). See also R. LEHNEN & C.
JOHNSON, FINANCING INDIANA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS: UPDATE 1989 (Under-funding of Indiana's state
foundation program resulted in districts depending more on local property taxes.).
41. Local school property taxes provide more than 40% of all school revenues and are the root
cause for school spending disparities in most states. T. JONES, supra note 19, at 89-90.
42. See supra note 26 for definition. For a discussion of assessed valuation, see T. JONES,
supra note 19, at 75-83. Local school districts rarely have any say in the setting of assessed
valuations which are generally established by other units of local government. Id.
43. See, e.g., Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (fex. 1989)
("The lower expenditures in the property-poor districts are not the result of lack of tax effort.
Generally, the property-rich districts can tax low and spend high while the property-poor districts
must tax high merely to spend low. In 1985-86 ... [tlhe 100 poorest districts had an average tax rate
of 74.5 cents and spent an average of $2,978 per student. The 100 wealthiest districts had an
average tax rate of 47 cents and spent an average of $7,233 per student.").
44. For a discussion of the effect of property tax rates on metropolitan development, see T.
JONES, supra note 19, at 85-89. Sharp discrepancies between tax rates of neighboring school
districts can adversely affect the ability of the community with the higher tax rate to compete for
new businesses and development necessary to raise the poorer districts assessed valuation and bring
the poorer district's tax rate down. Low assessed valuation and high tax rates may become a self-
perpetuating cycle. See, e.g., Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 393 ("Many [low tax rate] districts have
become tax havens."). When vastly different tax rates are needed to raise similar amounts of
revenue, the issue of taxpayer equity is raised. This note is solely concerned with the impact of
funding formulas on equality and adequacy of educational opportunity. The taxpayer equity problem
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valuation, identical tax rates in different districts may result in much different
expenditure levels per pupil.'u Per-pupil expenditure capability translates into
curriculum, staffing, materials, and other educational necessities and may well
affect the quality of the school system.'
Inadequate state revenue and difficulties with raising local revenue may also
be compounded by freezes and caps that the legislature places on local tax rates
and levies.47 Desiring to keep tax rates down, legislators may limit the local
district's ability to support the schools through local revenue. 4 Often, a local
tax increase will depend on taxpayers' acceptance in a local referendum.49
Thus, the school district's ability to raise revenue may well depend on local
politics."
Inadequate state revenues and the difficulty of sufficiently supplementing
state funds with local revenue has placed local districts in a serious financial
is beyond the scope of this note. See generally T. JONES, supra note 19, at 88-89.
45. In 1990, M.S.D. of Warren Township, Indiana, expended $4,793 per pupil with a General
Fund tax rate of 4.19, while Wawasee Community School Corporation, Indiana, expended only
$3,280 per pupil with a General Fund tax rate of 4.18. INDIANA FARM BUREAU ADDENDUM (1990)
[hereinafter ADDENDUM].
46. The relationship between expenditure levels and quality of education has been recognized
by state courts that have struck down state funding schemes. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 196-198 (Ky. 1990) (overwhelming evidence that under-funding of
Kentucky schools adversely affects quality of Kentucky schools); Helena Elementary School Dist.
v. State, 263 Mont. 44, 49, 769 P.2d 684, 687-88 (1989) (positive correlation between level of
school funding and level of educational opportunity); Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 393 (recognizing
effect of amount of money spent on a student and educational opportunity offered that student). See
also Banas, '89 School Report Cards Show Spending Can Pay, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 1, 1990, at
1,6, sec. 1. (Chicago area elementary schools with top test scores spend nearly forty percent more
money per pupil than schools with the lowest scores); Broder, 'Minimal' Ability Won't Sustain the
U.S., Chicago Tribune, Jan. 17, 1990, at 17, see. 1. (need for both money and reform to improve
educational performance of Nation's
children). See also Lehnen, supra note 19.
47. See T. JONES, supra note 19, at 77-78.
48. For examples of state formulas restricting local district's ability to raise local revenue, see
Helena, 769 P.2d at 688 (effect of Initiative 105 and freezing of property tax levies at 1986 levels);
Seattle School Dist. No. 1 of King City v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 483, 585 P.2d 71, 77-78 (1978)
(no independent local authority to raise funds without special excess levy election).
49. When a school district is required to raise taxes through a referendum, the tax increase issue
is placed on the ballot for voter approval. See, e.g., Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d at 483, 585 P.2d at 77-78.
(Legislature authorizes local districts to supplement state funding through special excess levy
elections. If the election fails twice in a year, the district must operate within the funds provided
by the state. Statewide, 40% of all students resided in districts in which levy elections failed.).
50. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 199 (Ky. 1990)
(Response of school districts to voter resistance to taxes results in many districts not adopting
permissive taxes.). See supra notes 48, 49. See also Andrews, Case Note, 7 NOLPE SCH. L.J. 104,
105-06 (1977) (right to education should not depend on local voter election).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 2 [1991], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol25/iss2/6
1991] FUNDING INDIANA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 279
bind."' The total amount of state and local revenue available to educate a child
in a school district may vary widely from district to district, resulting in unequal
educational opportunity for children in different geographical areas within the
state.52 Funding levels may also be generally insufficient to provide adequate
education. 3 Educational problems resulting from unequal and inadequate
school funding have precipitated various court challenges to educational funding
formulas.
C. Federal and State Constitutional Challenges to State Funding Schemes
1. The Federal Challenge
The federal route to challenging state funding schemes was definitively
foreclosed by San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.' In
Rodriguez, parents on behalf of school children in property-poor school districts
in Texas, challenged the state funding formula under the Equal Protection Clause
of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution?" The United
51. This bind comes at a time when the schools are under increased pressure to improve student
performance. See D. Kearns, Speech at U.S. Conference of Mayors (June 16, 1987) ("America's
public schools graduate 700,000 functional illiterates every year. And 700,000 more drop out....
the fact is, the basic skills of our work force - particularly at the entry level - are simply not good
enough for the United States to compete in a world economy."); Lehnen, supra note 19 at 2-3
(discussing economic-development approach to educational reform. "[Tihe reformers using
economic and human capital arguments define a case of need based on the emergence of a global
information economy and demonstrate, at least in a cross-national context, that investments in
education make good business sense." Id. at 3.). See also Goodwin, The Crisis in Public Education
and a Rationale for Federal Intervention, 1988 DEr. C.L. REv. 937 (The inability of states and local
districts to address problems of student incompetency justifies intervention by federal government
in critical curricular decisions).
52. For example, in Illinois, annual per pupil spending ranges from $12,866 to $2,095.
Spending per pupil depends increasingly on the school district's property wealth, and property wealth
differences continue to grow. Spending disparities often cause disparities in educational opportunity.
Harrisburg in Southern Illinois spends $3,400 a year per pupil compared with the state average of
$4,315, is able to offer only one language course at the high school, and has only fifteen computers.
Harrisburg's graduates must compete in college with students from schools able to spend much more
per pupil. Banas, School Funding Critics Seek Help, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 19, 1990, at 5, sec. 2.
Currently, 47 Illinois school districts are challenging the current Illinois funding formula in The
Committee for Educational Rights v. Thompson. (Copy of Complaint provided by Committee).
53. In Illinois, some high schools do not offer all the courses Illinois public colleges will begin
to require of incoming freshmen in the fall of 1993. Id. See also supra note 46.
54. 411 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973). For a full discussion of the federal role
in school fundihg challenges, see Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right to Education
Under State Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. EDUC. 93, 101-14.
55. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The plaintiffs argued that since the Texas funding scheme
relied heavily on local property tax revenue for local school funding, districts with low property
values were able to spend far less per pupil than districts with high property values, and these
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States Supreme Court held that poverty was not a suspect classification,' that
education was not a fundamental right 7 under the United States Constitution,
and, therefore, refused to apply strict scrutiny.' Using the rational-basis
test," the Court held that local control over schools' was a legitimate state
interest and that the Texas funding formula had a rational relationship to local
control.6' The Court stated that only an absolute deprivation of education
would violate the Equal Protection Clause.' The Supreme Court also
exhibited a strong inclination to stay out of state educational affairs.' 3
disparities violated the Equal Protection Clause. 411 U.S. at 1. The plaintiffs also argued that the
children in property poor districts constituted a suspect class and that education was a fundamental
right. Therefore the state needed to show a compelling governmental interest to justify the
disparities in per pupil expenditures. 411 U.S. at 19-20, 29. See infra notes 56-57 for definitions
of fundamental right and suspect class. See also Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public
Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 828-45 (1985) (discussion of
fourteenth amendment Equal Protection approach to education).
56. 411 U.S. at 28. A suspect classification results when government action distinguishes
between persons upon some basis, such as race, that contravenes established principles. NOWAK,
ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTITUTONAL LAW 531 (3d ed. 1986).
57. 411 U.S. at 35. Fundamental rights are rights that the Court recognizes as having a value
so essential to individual liberty that the Court is justified in reviewing acts of other branches of
government with heightened scrutiny. NOWAK, supra note 56, at 367. The Rodriguez Court used
an "explicit/implicit" test for fundamentality; fundamental rights are those found in the express terms
of the Constitution or that are necessarily implied from those terms. 411 U.S. at 35.
58. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959
(1973). Strict scrutiny is used when a legislative classification impinges upon the exercise of a
fundamental right or works to the disadvantage of a suspect class, and requires a compelling
government interest to justify the challenged legislation. NOWAK, supra note 56, at 530-31.
59. 411 U.S. at 40. When no fundamental right or suspect classification is involved, the
legislation is presumed valid and the government must only show a legitimate interest and a means
rationally related to that interest. NOWAK, supra note 56, at 530.
60. Local control is the term used to describe educational decision-making at the local school
district level. Although education is a state, not local responsibility, states have delegated
responsibility for day-to-day decisions to local school authorities, through local elected or appointed
school boards. Local decision-making can be an effective means for school improvement, but
without adequate funds, it is questionable how much control local officials actually have over their
districts. See infra notes 61, 80. For background discussion on local control, see Maltby, Local
Control of Schools: Two Views, 6 NOLuE ScH. L.J. 123 (1976); Williams, Gentry & La Morte, The
Atack on State Educational Finance Programs - An Overview, 2 NOLPE SCH. L. J. 1, 13-15 (1972).
61. The Supreme Court pointed out the benefits of local control, including the local district's
freedom to spend more than the state-provided minimum, participation by local residents in decision
making, and the opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and competition. 411 U.S. at 49-51.
The dissenting opinion in Rodriguez strongly questioned the validity of this interest. 411 U.S. at
64-69.
62. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37, reh 'g denied, 411 U.S. 959
(1973).
63. 411 U.S. at 41-42.
[The Justices] lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so
necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of
public revenues. ... [T]his case also involves the most persistent and difficult questions
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Because the Supreme Court did not find that education is a fundamental
right under the United States Constitution and rejected poverty as a suspect
class, the federal route to school funding challenges has been effectively
closed.64 After Rodriguez, funding formula challenges moved to state courts
and are now based exclusively on state constitutional grounds. 6"
2. State Challenges'
A state court challenge to a school funding formula is generally based on
two distinct clauses found in state constitutions, namely the state equal protection
clause and the state education clause.67 Often both clauses are used in
tandem.'
a. The Equal Protection Argument
State challenges based on state constitution equal protection clauses6 are
typically similar to federal equal protection challenges.' If a suspect
of educational policy, another area in which this court's lack of specialized knowledge
and experience counsels against premature interference with the informed judgments
made at the State and local levels ...
Id.. See Hubsch, supra note 54, at 107-08. (The Court's concerns about federalism and the lack
of judicial competence in the area of education have produced a doctrine of federal judicial
abstention in the area of education.).
64. For a discussion of the possibility of using federal substantive due process to protect
education rights, see Hubsch, supra note 54, at 112-14.
65. For discussion of the renaissance of interest in state constitutions as bases for rights, see
Utter & Piter, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20
IND. L. REv. 635 (1987). In recent years state courts have begun to rediscover the unique
protections their state constitutions afford. Id. at 636.
66. This section only gives a brief overview of state challenges. The area of state challenges
to educational funding formulas has been extensively reviewed by other writers. See, e.g., Hubsch,
supra note 54; Note, supra note 36.
67. State constitutions generally included clauses comparable to the United State Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause and separate education clauses. For an example of a state court using a
state equal protection clause to strike down a state funding formula, see Horton v. Meskill, 172
Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). Kentucky and Texas are examples of states that relied on state
education clauses to invalidate their respective state funding schemes. Rose v. Council for Better
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1990); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391
(Tex. 1989).
68. Arkansas, for example, used the state education clause to reinforce the state equal protection
clause in striking down its state funding formula. DuPree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark.
340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983).
69. For an example of the wording of a state equal protection clause, see infra text
accompanying note 157 (Indiana's equal protection clause).
70. See Ratner, supra note 55, at 845-51 (discussion of state constitutional equal protection
approach to education). See also Note, supra note 36, at 1671 ("When confronted with a state
equality provision in public school finance reform cases, state courts generally behave as they do
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classification or a fundamental right is involved, a state court applies strict
scrutiny, requiring a compelling state interest to justify the challenged legislative
classification. 7 If no suspect classification or fundamental right is involved,
the court applies a rational-basis analysis, upholding the challenged statute if the
statute bears a reasonable relationship to the state's legitimate interests.'
State equal protection challenges to educational funding formulas have
primarily focused on whether education is a fundamental right under the state
constitution. 73 State courts have generally rejected the federal Rodriguez
explicit/implicit test which finds that a fundamental right exists if the right is
explicitly or implicitly found in the constitution.74 Despite the fact that
education is mentioned in state constitutions, state courts are usually reluctant
to find a state fundamental right to education.7
In refusing to apply the Rodriguez test, some state courts pointed to the
inherent differences in state and federal constitutions, and to the need to apply
different fundamentality tests to federal and state constitutions.76 Other state
in other equality contexts and utilize the federal strict scrutiny/rational basis framework."). But see
Hubsch, supra note 54, at 94-95 (criticizing state's reliance on federal equal protection analysis and
reluctance to act independently in area of education rights); Williams, Equality Guarantees in State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1985) (discussing under-development of state
constitutional equality doctrines and arguing for analysis independent from federal framework).
71. See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 631, 376 A.2d 359,374-75 (1977) (finding
fundamental right to education and applying strict scrutiny to strike down state's funding scheme).
72. See, e.g. Lujan v. Colorado Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1022 (Colo. 1982) (applying
rational-basis analysis to uphold state funding scheme). For an argument that state courts should
apply an alternative mode of analysis to the strict scrutiny/rational-basis tests and use intermediate
scrutiny to examine constitutional challenges to state funding schemes, see Note, Constitutional
Issues in Properry Tax Based Public School Financing Systems, 8 B. C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 121
(1988).
73. See Note, supra note 36, at 1671-78 (discussing state approaches to fundamental right to
education). Following Rodriguez, most state courts have rejected poverty as a suspect classification.
See, e.g., Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1019-22 (rejecting wealth as a suspect classification). But see Washakie
County School Dist. Number One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied sub
nom. Hot Springs County School Dist. v. Washakie County School Dist., 449 U.S. 824 (1980)
(finds suspect classification based on wealth and strikes down state funding scheme).
74. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. at 35. For state rejecting Rodriquez test, see Robinson v. Cahill, 62
N.J. 473, 491, 515, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (court rejects Rodriguez test as inapplicable to state equal
protection claims, but strikes down funding scheme on state education clause grounds), 295, supp.
op. 63 N.J. 196,306 A.2d 65, cert. denied sub nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) and
on reh 'g. Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713, cert. denied sub nom. Klein v. Robinson,
423 U.S. 913 (1975).
75. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
76. "State constitutions, unlike the federal constitution, are not of unlimited powers and
specifically provide for a vast range of services, thus making unworkable a test that bases
fundamentality on whether a right is explicitly or implicitly granted in the constitution". Note, supra
note 72, at 132. See Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 13, 554 P.2d 139, 144 (1976) (The Oregon Bill of
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courts expressed apprehension that finding such a right would open the door to
state courts acting as "super school boards" and interfering in other aspects of
the educational system.' In addition, some state courts stressed the need to
defer to the legislature in education policy areas and the lack of manageable
judicial standards of educational equality.' Courts that refused to find a
fundamental right to education generally used a rational-basis analysis and
upheld state funding systems as furthering legitimate state purposes. 79 As in
Rodriguez, local control was the state interest typically asserted to justify
funding schemes.'
Some state courts used their own tests for fundamentality and found a
fundamental right to education."' State courts that found a fundamental right
to education generally used strict scrutiny to strike down funding schemes,'
directing the state legislature to remedy funding disparities among local school
Rights guarantees the right to sell and serve liquor by the drink; to describe such a right as
fundamental would be ludicrous.). See also, e.g., McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 641, 285
S.E.2d 156, 166 (1981) (court expresses fear that to apply Rodriguez test to Georgia Constitution
would place all local schemes of funding, such as police protection, under equal protection analysis).
77. See Campbell v. Bd. of Educ. of New Milford, 193 Conn. 93, 98-99, 475 A.2d 289, 295-
97 (1984) (A student challenged the policy of a local school board that imposed academic sanctions
for non-attendance, claiming that grade reduction impaired his fundamental right to education. The
student argued that Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) established a state
fundamental right to education, and thus the court had to apply strict scrutiny to survey all
government regulations concerning public education. The court disagreed, limiting the Horton
holding to issues of equal educational opportunity and deferred to local school board in area of
school policy). See also supra note 67, 71.
78. See, e.g., McDaniel, 248 Ga. at 260, 285 S.E.2d at 167 (court discusses inherent difficulty
in establishing judicially manageable standards for education and defers to the legislature to define
the state's financial commitment to education); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 798, 537
P.2d 635, 640 (1975) (court expressing fear of becoming 'super legislature' if entering into area of
school finance.).
79. See supra note 72.
80. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of the City School Dist of the City of Cincinnati v. Walter, 58
Ohio St. 2d 368, 376, 390 N.E.2d 813, 822 (1979) (court refers to importance of local control in
upholding funding system), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980). The local control rationale has been
heavily criticized by some courts who have echoed the dissent in Rodriguez. See supra note 61.
See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 769, 557 P.2d 929, 948, 135 Cal Reptr. 345, 369
(1976) (referring to the rationale of local control as a "cruel illusion"), cert. denied sub nom.
Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
81. See, e.g., Hortonv. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 630, 376 A.2d 359, 373-74, (1977) (finding
fundamental right to education due to emphasis placed on education by state legislature throughout
the state's history); Washakie County School Dist. Number 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333
(Wyo.) (finding fundamental right due to emphasis placed on education in Wyoming Constitution),
cert. denied sub nom. Hot Springs County School Dist. v. Washakie County School Dist., 449 U.S.
824 (1980).
82. See cases cited supra note 81. But see Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590
(1973) (state court found fundamental right to education yet only applied rational-basis analysis and
upheld funding formula).
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districts.Y
Although some state equal protection challenges have been successful,"
such challenges have limitations. Equal protection addresses equality of
funding, but does not address adequacy of funding levels.' A funding formula
that merely guarantees participation in the public schools or a minimum level of
education may survive an equal protection challenge." Theoretically, equal
protection can even result in the state setting minimal equal funding levels and
penalizing districts that spend above these levels.' A state education clause
challenge, however, does not share the shortcomings of an equal protection
clause challenge.' The education clause can be used to mandate both equality
of funding and adequate funding levels."
b. The Education Clause Argument
Challenges based on education clauses of state constitutions are totally
independent of any federal model and are potentially more effective than
challenges based on state equal protection clauses.' An education clause
challenge relies on the state court's duty to interpret the state constitution and
to ensure that the state legislature's exercise of power is in compliance with the
83. See, e.g., Washaide, 606 P.2d at 336 (court expresses constitutional standard that the level
of school spending must not be a function of wealth, but leaves the ultimate solution to be shaped
by the legislature according to this standard).
84. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 68, 81.
85. For a full discussion of the failings of a state equal protection challenge, see Hubsch, supra
note 54, at 114-27. "[Eiqual protection does not directly address issues of the quality of education
received by the vast majority of students." id. at 127. See also Note, supra note 36, at 1670-79.
(outlining problems of state equal protection approach).
86. See, e.g., Britt v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282, 287, 357 S.E.2d 432, 436
(1987) (only equal access to participation in schools is a fundamental right, rev. denied, 320 N.C.
790, 360 S.E.2d 71 (1987); Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of Cincinnati v. Walter, 58 Ohio
St.2d 368, 379, 390 N.E.2d 813, 825 (1979) (only if students are effectively deprived of educational
opportunity will court interfere with legislative discretion), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
87. Hubsch, supra note 54, at 106 (discussing a lowest-common denominator approach to
equalization). See also Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at 15-16,
Lake Central School Corporation v. State, Cause No. 56C01-8703-CP-81 (Newton Cir. Ct., Jan.
29, 1990) (State projecting that equalization would require certain school districts to increase funding
and others to decrease funding to meet the State's per pupil rate. "While the plaintiffs may benefit
somewhat, the effect upon other school corporations would no doubt be devastating with facilities
closed and teachers laid off. A small price to pay for equalization." Id. at 16.).
88. See infra notes 90-104 and accompanying text.
89. Id.
90. For a strong argument of the advantages of using an education clause argument in a funding
formula challenge, see Hubsch, supra note 54, at 127-33. The Hubsch article gives the text of all
fifty state education clauses. Id. at 134-40.
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state constitution. 9' In an education clause challenge, the court looks for an
enforceable education mandate in the education clause of the state constitution
and appraises whether the state legislature has satisfied this mandate.92 By
interpreting the state education mandate, the court provides concrete standards
by which to judge the current funding formula and gives guidelines for
subsequent legislative efforts."
The court may interpret the state's education clause as mandating both equal
and adequate educational opportunity.' State education clauses often include
words such as "uniform" and "general", which provide the basis for an equality
91. See, e.g., Seattle School Dist. No. I of King City v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 485, 585P.2d 71, 87 (1978) (The judiciary has the ultimate duty to interpret the constitution. "This duty
must be exercised even when an interpretation serves as a check on the activities of another branch
of government..."). State courts use a variety of factors to interpret the state education mandate.A court may look at the wording of the education clause and the uniqueness of the clause in the state
constitution. See, e.g. Seattle 90 Wash. 2d at 484, 490-95, 585 P.2d at 84-85, 90-97 (wording of
education clause and uniqueness of clause establishes 'paramount duty' of state to 'make ampleprovision' for education of state's children). The court may look at the intention of the framers, as
seen through records of constitutional debates and contemporaneous writings. See, e.g., Edgewood
Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394-96 (rex. 1989) (court using history of state
education clause and education system to interpret clause, with heavy emphasis on debates of
constitutional convention). A comparison of the education clause with other state education clauses
may also be used. See, e.g., Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672, 681-85, 255 S.E.2d 859, 869-74(1979) (court exploring other states' interpretation of "thorough and efficient" in order to interpret
West Virginia's education clause). But see Note, supra note 36, at 1660. (decisions by courts
interpreting identically worded or nearly identically worded provisions often reach vastly different
results).
92. See, e.g., Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 394 ("By express constitutional mandate, thelegislature must make 'suitable' provision for an 'efficient' system for the 'essential' purpose of a
'general diffusion of knowledge'. While these are admittedly not precise terms, they do provide a
standard by which this court must, when called upon to do so, measure the constitutionality of the
legislatures actions.").
93. Such standards go beyond bare equality and define specific goals that the state education
system must achieve. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 193-197(Ky. 1990) (An efficient 'system of education must have as its goal to provide each and every child
with an equal opportunity to an adequate education. The court lists seven areas that an efficient and
adequate system of education must address, including "sufficient oral and written communication
skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization." Id. at 74);
Pauley, 162 W.Va at 688, 255 S.E.2d at 877 (A thorough and efficient system of schools mustdevelop as best as educational expertise allows "the minds, bodies and social morality of its chargesto prepare them for useful and happy occupations, recreation and citizenship," and do so
economically. The court continued to list eight areas of learning the education system needed to
address, including "knowledge of government sufficient to equip the individual to make informed
choices as a citizen." Id.).
94. See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1990) ("Each child, every child, in this
commonwealth must be provided with an equal opportunity to have an adequate education.").
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analysis similar to an equal protection analysis.95 Education clauses may also
include statements of purpose that emphasize the value of education to the
state.96 These statements of purpose can provide the basis for judicial
assessment of the adequacy of the state's educational funding scheme and the
quality of the state educational system.'
For the state court to use the education clause as the basis for assessing
quality as well as equality, the court must interpret the education clause as
creating an affirmative duty of the state legislature to establish and support an
educational system that will provide for an educated citizenry.' Because
effective state government depends on citizens who possess the tools to
participate meaningfully in the state system of self-government, the state
legislature is mandated to provide a system of education that will produce an
educated citizenry." Educational quality or adequacy must be measured in
95. See, e.g., "The legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a
complete and uniform system of public instruction. WYo. CONST. Art. VII, sec. 1; Washakie County
School Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 320 (Wyo.), cert. denied sub nora. Hot Springs
County School Dist. v. Washakie County School Dist., 449 U.S. 824 (1980) (court uses "uniform"
term in education clause to assess inequities of states educational system). But see "Plaintiffs have
lacked success on claims under the education articles of the state constitution when they have merely
used it as a surrogate for or reiteration of an equal protection claim." Hubsch, supra note 54, at
129.
96. See, e.g., "Intelligence and virtue being the safeguards of liberty and the bulwark of a free
and good government, the state shall ever maintain a general, suitable and efficient system of free
public schools and shall adopt all suitable means to secure to the people the advantages and
opportunities of education." ARK. CONST. art. XIV, sec.1; Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30,
279 Ark. 340, 343, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (1983) (Because of importance of education to citizenship,
as stated in education clause, state must provide more than bare and minimal education).
97. For a discussion of interpreting rights and duties contained in state constitutional education
clauses, based on the wording of the clauses, see Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right
to Bilingual Education, 9 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 52, 66-71 (1974) (categorizing state education
clauses as to potential for enforcing educational rights and duties); Ratnier, supra note 55, at 814-22
(interpreting duty to educate based on language of state education clauses).
98. The state's duty is focused, not on the needs of the students, but on the needs of the state,
and these state needs become the bases for assessing the adequacy of the state education system. See
infra note 99. See also infra notes 173, 229.
99. This argument is carefully explained in Hubsch, supra note 54, at 95-101. Hubsch
discusses the political philosophy of republicanism and how republicanism relates to the background
of public education in the states. Republicanism is based on principles of self-government, which
is dependent on an educated citizenry, thus the necessity of education in a republic, as recognized
by early state constitutions. "Education for citizenship and self-government, ... affirmatively
obligates the state to provide all citizens with the quality and character of education appropriate for
participation in political and community affairs. The state must provide an education that conforms
to the level of participation self-governing communities expect from the citizenry." Id. at 99. The
requirement that the state provide for an educated citizenry involves more than providing students
with a minimal education. Dupree, 651 S.W.2d at 93. Education must prepare students with the
skills to exercise first amendment freedoms, but also with the skills to compete in today's market.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King City v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94-95 (Wash. 1978). Fora catalogue
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terms of whether the state educational system has, in fact, provided for an
educated citizenry." i
Whether focusing on equality or quality of education, challenges to funding
formulas based on education clauses have had mixed results.'"' However, the
recent Montana, Kentucky, and Texas decisions indicate a growing willingness
of state courts to use education clauses to overturn state funding schemes."°e
By using state education clauses to decide funding formula challenges, state
courts can avoid equal protection problems0 3 and address questions of quality
as well as equality."°
of the types of skills seen as essential to an educated citizenry, see Rose v. Council for Better Educ.,
Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212-13 (Ky. 1990) and Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 688, 255 S.E.2d
859, 877 (1979).
100. See, e.g., Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d. at 494, 585 P.2d at 94-95 ("[Tlhe State's constitutional
duty goes beyond mere reading, writing and arithmetic. It also embraces broad educational
opportunities needed in the contemporary setting to equip our children for their role as citizens ...
Education plays a critical role in a free society. It must prepare our children to participate
intelligently and effectively in our open political system to ensure that system's survival." The court
continued to outline broad educational concepts of essential skills in terms of the constitutional
mandate for education and held that these concepts made up the minimum of the education
constitutionally required.). See also Ratner, supra note 55, at 781-94 (discussion of significance of
adequate basic skills development to purposes of American public education, including political
function). Furthermore, the duty to provide for an educated citizenry is a state duty despite the
delegation of authority to local districts. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 193 (court affirms importance of
education to present and future of state, and stresses that sole responsibility for providing for school
system is that of General Assembly's and that obligation cannot be shifted to local school districts).
For an argument that a federal constitutional mission exists to educate for effective citizenship, see
Norris, Education for Sovereignty: A Bicentennial View of the Purpose of Education, 1988 DET.
C.L. REV. 928.
101. Courts have rejected education clauses challenges for various reasons, including deference
to the legislature and reluctance to venture into the uncharted area of educational standards. See
supra note 78. (state courts using both state equal protection and education clauses rejecting
challenges on these grounds). Courts that have struck down funding formulas under the education
clause have asserted judicial responsibility to interpret the state constitution and to ensure that the
state legislature complies with constitutional mandates. Such courts have found little problem
relating funding levels to equality or quality of education. See, e.g., Edgewood Indep. School Dist.
v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (1989). "If the system is not 'efficient' or not 'suitable,' the legislature
has not discharged its constitutional duty and it is our duty to say so." Id. at 394. "The amount
of money spent on a student has a real and meaningful impact on the educational opportunity offered
that student." Id. at 393. See also supra note 46.
102. Rose, 790 S.W.2d 186; Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684
(1989); Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d 391. (All three states overturned state funding formulas because
of violations of state constitution education clauses.).
103. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 100.
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II. FUNDING INDIANA'S SCHOOLS
Indiana's funding scheme has created inequality and inadequacy of
educational opportunity in the state, and is vulnerable to an Indiana constitutional
challenge. This section will discuss the background of school funding in
Indiana, the specific problems caused by the funding scheme, and the pending
challenge to the funding scheme.
A. How Indiana Funds Public Education
Prior to 1973," Indiana schools were funded through a foundation
program, " which guaranteed a minimum revenue amount to all school
districts."t' The goal of the foundation program was to increase the state share
of support of the schools and reduce reliance on local property taxes."
Under the foundation program, each district was granted a fixed amount of
money per pupil per year from the state; local districts could supplement state
revenue through local property taxes."
Because the state grant was inadequate to meet the needs of local districts,
districts were forced to raise substantial local revenue to supplement the state
grant." ° Property-rich districts were able to raise the necessary revenue with
relatively low tax rates, while poorer districts were forced to tax at much higher
rates to meet basic educational requirements."' The amount of revenue
available to school districts and district per-pupil expenditure levels often became
105. Before 1930, Indiana schools relied primarily upon local revenues from property taxes,
supplemented by state distributions from a dedicated common school fund and a state tax levy for
special relief to districts with low taxable wealth. In 1933, in order to provide poorer school districts
with a proportionately greater share of state funds than wealthier districts, the state began to assume
a substantial share of local school costs, distributing funds raised through a new gross income tax
as tuition support on a per teaching unit basis. This note only gives an outline of school funding
in Indiana. For history and analysis of Indiana school funding, see generally R. BOONE, A HISTORY
OF EDUCATION IN INDIANA 164-217, 324-36 (1892 & photo. reprint 1941); R. LEHNEN & C.
JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 1-12 (detailed analysis of Indiana's funding scheme); Costerison, School
Finance: the 1984 School Funding Formula, in INDIANA SCHOOL LAw 1983 (1983).
106. See supra note 32.
107. Local districts that imposed a specific local tax rate received guaranteed state funds. The
goal of this funding scheme was to reduce reliance on property taxes and equalize per pupil
expenditures for equal local property tax effort. In other words, districts with similar tax rates would
receive similar amounts of state money. R. LEHNEN & C. JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 1-2.
108. R. LEHNEN & C. JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 1.
109. R. LEHNEN & C. JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 2.
110. Id.
1 11. INDIANA SCHOOL STUDY COMMISSION, AN EVALUATION OF INDIANA PUBLIC SCHOOLS
423 (1949). See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text for discussion of relationship between
property value and taxation.
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a function of local commercial or industrial development." 2
In order to keep escalating property taxes down and to bring the varying
expenditure levels among school corporations closer together, the Indiana
General Assembly, in 1973, put a freeze on the amount of local revenues a local
district could raise."' The freeze fixed local revenue levies at the 1973 level;
any additional funds needed by the district were to be supplied by the state." 4
A local district could raise an excess levy only if the levy gained voter approval
through a referendum."'
The freeze locked into place any inequalities between districts in
expenditure levels per pupil that existed prior to 1973.26 When the freeze
went into effect, expenditures per pupil varied widely throughout the state." 7
These disparate spending levels became the bases for funding formula
calculations over the next seventeen years."
5
Since 1973, the funding scheme gradually has increased reliance on local
property taxes." 9 In 1979, the General Assembly authorized schools to
increase the property tax levy,"2 which increased the local share of school
revenue.' 2' In 1984, the state permitted local levies to increase according to
112. "This great disparity in taxpaying ability as represented by assessed valuation per resident
pupil to a large extent grows out of the existence of many unduly small school administrative units."
Id. In 1959, the state attempted to remedy some of these disparities with the Reorganization Act
(1959 Ind. Acts ch. 202). In order to provide more equalized educational opportunities to pupils,
greater equity in school tax rates and a more efficient use of funds, the Act set minimum standards
for schools and allowed consolidation of schools.
113. The main purpose of this freeze was to prevent escalating tax rates resulting from the
inadequacies of the foundation grants. The freeze was a measure aimed at tax-payer relief and was
not formulated according to any educational policy. R. LEHNEN & C. JOHNSON, supra note 40, at
2.
114. Costerison, supra note 105, at 11-2 to H-3.
115. R. LEHNEN & C. JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 2.
116. Id.
117. For instance, in 1973, South Spencer County School Corporation spent $534 per pupil and
East Chicago spent $1,248 per pupil. R. LEHNEN & C. JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 2.
118. "The present school distribution formula is based largely on historical conditions rather
than on policies focused on the educational needs in school corporations." R. LEHNEN & C.
JOHNSON, supra note 40, at I.
119. Costerison, supra note 105, at 11-3.
120. With a levy freeze, if assessed valuation goes up, tax rates go down. Assessed valuations
had generally risen from 1973 to 1979. The General Assembly restructured the rates to allow local
districts to raise additional revenue from this increased valuation in property. See R. LEHNEN & C.
JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 25.
121. In fact, the property tax increases resulted in fewer state dollars distributed to the schools.
Id. at 8.
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the district's increase in assessed valuations." These adjustments in the
formula increased available revenue, but did nothing to reduce the disparities of
per-pupil expenditures,"2 nor did the adjustments remedy the wide differences
in tax rates from district to district.'
Currently, the formula attempts to deal with problems of inequality."n
In 1986, the Indiana General Assembly recognized the problems of inequalities
among school districts and added an equalization factor to the formula, giving
a minimum guarantee per pupil.l" The equalization factor attempts to bring
low-spending districts up to a state norm.1 7 The state has also increased its
share of support for schools."n Despite these measures, differences among
district per pupil expenditure levels have actually increased. 12'
B. Problems with Indiana's School Funding Formula
1. Problems of Inequality
Under Indiana's funding formula, wide disparities exist in district per-pupil
expenditures and in local tax rates. " Local school districts are not equally
122. The formula assumed that the local district's property tax levies went up each year in
proportion to the average increase in assessed valuation. School districts were not actually required
to raise this maximum levy amount, but the districts would lose state money if they did not. Id.
123. Id. at 34-35.
124. Id. at 35.
125. Id. at 8-9. See IND. CODE ANN. § 21-3-1.6 (West Supp. 1990).
126. In 1989 the minimum guarantee was $2500. R. LEHNEN & C. JOHNSON, supra note 40,
at 8.
127. Id. Criticism of the equalization formula has often been vehement. See Letter from Joint
Services Agreement Committee to Indiana School Superintendents (Sept. 29, 1989) (calling for
districts to join in challenge of Indiana public school funding formula). "The 'Equalization Formula'
- as it was written - would have provided greater parity for children and taxpayers, but it was
twisted, bent, and reshaped by powerful legislators for reasons still undisclosed. Although the
present formula has enabled many school districts to reach minimal levels in per-pupil expenditures,
it has caused greater disparities than existed prior to its inception." Id.
128. In 1972-73, 67% of all school revenue came from local sources. By 1987-88 only 38%
came from local sources. Indiana relies less on property tax than the national average. R. LEHNEN
& C. JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 34.
129. Id. at 19. See also Wood, Indiana School Finance Equity (Occasional Paper. No. 2, June
1990) (detailed study of Indiana funding scheme inequities).
130. The inequalities of the formula can be shown by a few examples drawn from a single
county in 1990. In Lake County, assessed valuation amounts behind each student range from
$133,397 in Whiting, to $6,675 in Hobart Township. Tax rates range from $5.42 per $100 assessed
valuation in Whiting, to $10.65 in the City of Hobart. Amounts expended per pupil range from
$5,371 in Whiting, to $3,138 in Lake Central school district. Statistics from ADDENDUM, supra
note 45. Some question whether varying assessment practices among Indiana counties account for
differences in assessed valuations. If some areas are under assessed, the-state's disparity in tax rates
may not actually reflect disparity in taxpayer burden. However, no current information supports this
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willing to raise necessary revenue. 31  Districts with already high tax rates may
find their communities resistant to increased school taxes. 13 2  Whether
appointed by the local city council or elected, local school boards are sensitive
to the political ramifications of tax increases.1
Even if a school board is willing to raise new taxes, it may be unable to do
so if the district has reached the levy ceiling placed by the state."3 Such a
district must gain voter approval through a referendum to raise revenue above
this ceiling. " The level of expenditure per pupil is directly dependent on the
ability and willingness of the local community to support local education."
Identical amounts spent per pupil may not ensure identical educational
opportunity.' 37 However, the amount of revenue available may well affect
curricular and extra-curricular offerings, class sizes, supplies and materials,
facilities, and counseling services."3 Differences in expenditure among school
premise. R. LEHINEN & C. JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 25. Regardless of county assessment
practices, local school districts have no say in the setting of assessed valuations. See supra note 42.
See also Task Force Report of Financing Public Education in the State of Indiana 5 (report prepared
for State Superintendent of Education, Aug. 23, 1990) [hereinafter "Task Force"] (noting "[t]he very
obvious overall disparity in Indiana's financial investment per pupil compared to the North Central
region or the national average. We do compare favorably to the Deep South, if that is to be this
state's destiny.").
131. See supra note 50.
132. The statistics alone do not indicate the range of problems created by high tax rates.
Increased taxes in a community with already high tax rates may severely hinder local economic
development, because such a community must compete for new businesses and housing with
neighboring communities with much lower tax rates. The School City of Hobart, for instance, had
a 1990 tax rate of 10.65. Hobart abuts Merrillville which had a 1990 tax rate of 4.99. In terms of
attracting new businesses, industry or residences, neighboring Merrillville with its lower tax rate has
a distinct advantage. Statistics from ADDENDUM, supra note 45.
133. See supra note 50.
134. The current funding formula continues to require voter approval for all general fund
property tax levies that exceed levels permitted by statute. R. LEHNEN & C. JOHNSON, supra note
40, at 10. In 1986, the School Town of Munster sponsored a successful referendum to add
$600,000 in local taxes for teachers' salaries and school improvements. Carlson, School Funding
Scored, Post Tribune, Nov. 30, 1989, at A6. Munster has the highest community per capita income
in the state but cannot raise new money without a referendum because of the freeze. Id.
135. Since 1973, only 23 out of 41 school districts have succeeded in winning voter approval
through referendum. R. LEHNEN & C. JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 10.
136. The impact of local property taxes on the quality of local education appears to contradict
the fact that the Indiana General Assembly, not local districts,is ultimately responsible for the state
system of education. See infra, note 196 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 99-100 and
accompanying text.
137. See T. JONES, supra note 19, at 163-64 (discussing need to adapt spending levels to
student needs and local factors to achieve equal educational opportunity).
138. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. See also Task Force, supra note 130, at 5
(noting "[tihe inequities in current funding and resulting wide disparities in educational opportunities
through out Indiana.").
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districts often translate into differences in educational opportunity. 3
2. Problems of Adequacy
Under Indiana's funding formula for education, Indiana schools, as a
whole, have been funded at lower levels than the national average.'"
Although critics question the relationship between funding levels and quality of
education, 4' strong evidence indicates that Indiana's low funding levels affect
the quality of education in the state. 42 Indiana academic performance lags
well behind the national average. 43
The state has recognized the deficiencies of Indiana's educational system
139. See R. LEHNEN & C. JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 32-33 (discussing how Indiana's funding
formula has locked some school districts into permanent conditions of low expenditures and deficient
educational opportunity). "While it is recognized that expenditures are not a perfect indicator of
education quality, it is a generally accepted surrogate measure of quality. By implication the lower
spending districts no doubt have difficulties in offering the same quality of education opportunity as
the higher spending ones". Id. at 33. See also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
140. Indiana's 1988-89 average per-pupil expenditure of $3,858 was less than the national
average of $4,509 and was the lowest per-pupil average of all North Central States except Kentucky,
Nebraska, and Missouri. Indiana Farm Bureau, supra note 26, at 15. Inequalities resulting from
the Indiana funding formula are not as extreme as those in other states. Indiana's highest 1990 per-
pupil expenditure was $5,371 compared to the state's lowest per-pupil expenditure of $2,763. 1990
statistics from ADDENDUM, supra note 45. Compare this range with the more extreme ranges of
Illinois, supra note 52, and Texas, supra note 43. However, Indiana's 1990 highest per-pupil
expenditure of $5,371 closely equates to Wisconsin's 1988-89 average per-pupil expenditure of
$5,117. INDIANA FARM BUREAU, supra note 26, at 15.
141. See Defendant'sMotion for Summary Judgment at 33, Lake Central School Corp. v. State,
Cause No. 56COI-8703-CP-81 (Newton Cir. Ct., Dec. 1, 1989) ("Using the most recent measure
of educational performance in Indiana ... there is no mathematical correlation between test scores
and educational funding among the school districts of Indiana."). See also Response, supra note 87,
at 5.
142. See R. LEHNEN & C. JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 49-81 (analysis of statistical indicators
of student performance and correlation with Indiana school funding levels). See also Task Force,
supra note 130, at 5 ('An alarming and growing number of school districts are even now tempering
program which consequently inhibit the academic, social and thinking skills of our future workforce
and citizens.").
143. See R. LEHNEN & C. JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 52-54 (Based on 6 educational
performance indicators, Indiana ranks in the bottom half of all states on all 6 indicators.). See also
State Education Performance Chart Supplement 1988-89 (Wall Chart), U.S. Dept. of Educ., May
1990. (Indiana ranks 32nd in the nation in its per-pupil expenditures. Among the twenty-two states
using the SAT test, Indiana ranks eighteenth in average SAT scores, better only than South Carolina,
North Carolina, Georgia and Washington D.C. Less than thirty per-cent of Indiana public schools
offer advance placement programs. Indiana ranks forty-eighth in the nation in students scoring a
3 or above on advance placement tests. Id.).
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and in the past few years has taken steps to improve student performance."
However, the state's willingness to create educational programs has not been
followed by the state's willingness to commit the necessary funds." Indiana
continues to fall behind national averages both in per-pupil spending and in pupil
performance.'" Any challenge to Indiana's funding formula must focus on
these problems of inadequate funding and performance as well as on problems
of inequality.
C. The Pending Challenge to Indiana's Funding Formula47
Currently, Indiana's funding formula is being challenged on state
constitutional grounds.' In 1987, students, parents, taxpayers, and school
officials of Lake Central School Corporation filed suit against the State Board
of Tax Commissioners. 49 The plaintiffs claim that under the Indiana equal
144. See Summary of the Governor's Excel for Education (as passed by the 1989 General
Assembly), INDIANA FARM BUREAU, supra note 26, at 26-27 (outlining reform efforts including
ISTEP testing and At Risk Program).
145. See, e.g., INDIANA FARM BUREAU, supra note 26, at 25 (The Prime Time Program,
designed to encourage school districts to reduce class sizes in the primary grades, does not fully fund
the hiring of additional teachers necessary to lower pupil/teacher ratios.). See also Task Force,
supra note 130, at 5 ("Indiana's less affluent school districts, and indeed, many who are considered
relatively affluent, will find themselves impotent to respond to new standards and new expectations
from [Indiana] and the nation.").
146. See R. LEHNEN & C. JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 55-58, 65-67 (indicating relative decline
in performance scores and widening of expenditure gap despite increases in state spending for
education).
147. An earlier challenge to the state funding formula came in 1973. Jensen v. State, Cause No.
24, 474 (Johnson County Cir. Ct. Jan. 15, 1973). Parents and students of school districts in
Hamilton, Howard and St. Joseph Counties brought suit against the state based on the equal
protection clauses of the United States and Indiana Constitutions, as well as the education clause of
the Indiana Constitution. Id. at 2. The plaintiffs argued that the state's financial structure created
disparities in amounts expended per pupil, resulting in unequal educational opportunities. Id. at 2-3.
Thus, the plaintiffs contended, the quality of education became a function of the wealth of a district
and geographic accident. Id. at 3.
The district court used a rational basis analysis, and held disparities in expenditures among
districts were not unreasonable or unrelated to differing costs faced by different districts. Id. at 22.
The court pointed to "local control" as a significant justification for variances in expenditures,
stating that local control of schools was necessary to make "education a viable program responsive
to local needs and yet progressive and experimental beyond set minimums." Id. at 27.
Furthermore, the court was not convinced that differences in expenditures related to differences in
quality of education. Id. at 25. The court concluded that ultimate relief lay properly with the
legislature. Id. at 29. The Jensen decision was never appealed.
148. Lake Central School Corp. v. State, Cause No. 487-109 (Lake Superior Ct. filed Feb. 20,
1987) (renumbered Cause No. 56COI-8703-CP-81, Newton Circuit Ct.). The case is currently
scheduled for trial in September, 1991.
149. Lake Central is in Lake County, Indiana, and includes the communities of Schererville,
St. John and Dyer. Lake Central was joined in the suit by 52 school districts comprising the Joint
Services Agreement on July 9, 1990. See supra note 127.
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protection and education clauses, Indiana fails to provide for a uniform system
of schools."s The plaintiffs claim that a funding system that requires a school
district to tax its residents at a rate far above the state average in order to spend
less than the state average per pupil is discriminatory.' Plaintiffs also
contend that disparities in funding affect quality of education in Lake Central
Schools. 5
2
The state has replied that per pupil expenditures do not reflect educational
opportunity, and that disparity among school districts does not prove denial of
equal protection.'53 The state has argued that absolute equality of funding is
not required and that differences among school districts are justified by the state
interest in local control." The state also contends that plaintiffs have not
proven inadequacy of education in Lake Central Schools." s
The arguments posed by both sides in the Lake Central challenge are
similar to those seen in other states' challenges, addressing both state equal
protection and education clauses. " This note has previously discussed how
state equal protection and education clause arguments have been employed
within the national context and will now analyze how Indiana's equal protection
and education clauses can be used to challenge Indiana's funding formula.
III. How INDIANA'S FUNDING FORMULA CAN BE CHALLENGED
A. The Equal Protection Clause Challenge
Article I, section 23 of the Indiana Constitution reads: "The General
Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or
immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
150. Complaint, at 6-7, Lake Central School Corp. v. State, Cause No. 487-109 (Lake Superior
Ct. filed Feb. 20, 1987) (renumbered Cause No. 56CO1-8703-CP-81, Newton Circuit Ct.).
151. In 1984-85, Lake Central ranked 252nd out of 304 school districts in per-pupil spending,
despite the fact that Lake Central taxpayers had the 7th highest tax rate in the state. Id. at 6. See
also Plaintiff's Reply Brief at 21-22, Lake Central School Corp. v. State, Cause No. 56COI-8704-
CP-81 (Newton Cir. Ct. no date). In 1987, in order to meet the state average, the school district
would need an additional $1,805,097. Id. at 22.
152. Effects of revenue deficiency include reduced teacher salaries, larger class sizes and less
support personnel than neighboring school districts. Id. at 23.
153. See Defendant's Motion, supra note 141.
154. Defendant's Response, supra note 87, at 3-4, 26-28 (demonstrating absurdity of results
if constitution required equal expenditures per pupil and arguing that funding formula furthers state
interest of local control).
155. Id. at 11-12 (arguing that Lake Central may actually offer more educational opportunity
than richer neighbor).
156. See Complaint, supra note 150.
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citizens."' Although this clause is commonly referred to as Indiana's equal
protection clause, it actually has a very different origin than the federal Equal
Protection Clause." s The Indiana clause reflects the framers' concern that no
individual enjoy any special rights or privileges and focuses on prohibiting
special privileges rather than guaranteeing equal rights.' Despite the
differences in wording and purpose between the Indiana and federal equal
protection clauses, Article I, section 23 of the Indiana Constitution has been
interpreted to grant protection substantially identical to that provided under the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution."W
In order to apply strict scrutiny to Indiana's funding formula, the funding
formula must impinge upon a fundamental right to education. t6 In Sidle v.
Majors, the Indiana Supreme Court used the Rodriguez "explicit/implicit"
test' 62 and determined that fundamental rights are those rights that have their
origins in express terms of the Indiana constitution or that are necessarily to be
implied by it."6 If this approach to fundamental rights is used, a fundamental
right to education exists in Indiana since Indiana's Constitution refers specifically
to education.6'
157. IND. CONST. art. I, sec. 23.
158. For a discussion of the differences between the Indiana and federal equal protection
clauses, see Baude, Is There Independent Life in the Indiana Constitution?, 62 IND. L.J. 263, 270-71
(1987) ("This provision, ... was once described by the Indiana Supreme Court as the 'antithesis' of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution."; Utter
& Pitier, supra note 65, at 669 ("Mhe Indiana delegates' most likely target was prohibition of
special privileges.").
159. For an illustration of the different purposes of the Indiana equal protection clause from the
federal equal protection clause, see C. KETrLEBOROUGH, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA 1780-
1850 398 (1916 & photo. reprint 1971). ("All the members of the political States of Indiana shall
have the same rights, privileges, and immunities, because one man is as good as another, if not a
'leetle better'." (quoting constitutional provision proposed and rejected at 1850 Indiana
Constitutional Convention)). See also J. WALSH, THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE INDIANA
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 179 (1987) (Section 23 "addressed the evil of special legislation, which had
grown into unmanageable proportions during the pioneer period.").
160. Indiana High School Athletic Assoc. v. Raike, 164 Ind. App. 169, 176 n.2, 329 N.E.2d
66, 71 n.2 (1975). (When the federal equal protection clause is violated, the Indiana equal protection
clause is necessarily also violated. The rights intended to be protected under both clauses are
identical). See also Utter & Piter, supra note 65, at 666.
161. See infra note 167 and accompanying text. (Indiana uses same equal protection analysis
as federal model.). See also Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 274 Ind. 661, 664, 413 N.E.2d 891, 893
(1980) (discussing use of strict scrutiny in Indiana). See supra notes 57-58 for definitions of
fundamental rights and strict scrutiny.
162. 264 Ind. 206, 209-10, 341 N.E.2d 763, 766-67 (Ind. 1976) (issue in case was
constitutionality of Indiana guest statute). See supra note 57 for definition of explicit/implicit test.
163. Sidle, 264 Ind. at 209-10, 341 N.E.2d at 766-67. The Indiana Supreme Court held that
the right to bring an action for common law negligence was not a fundamental right. Id. at 766.
In Sidle, both the federal and Indiana Constitutions were discussed. Id. at 767.
164. IND. CONST. art. 8.
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Using the Rodriguez explicit/implicit test to ascertain a fundamental right
to education presents distinct problems. First, in Sidle, the Rodriguez test was
used negatively; the court refused to recognize a fundamental right to bring an
action for common law negligence because the right was neither expressed in
nor implied from the state constitution."6  No Indiana court has found a
fundamental right merely because the subject was mentioned in the Indiana
Constitution." Other Indiana decisions have held that the rights intended to
be protected by the Indiana equal protection clause are identical to those
protected by the fourteenth amendment and must be tested by the same
standards."6  Since Rodriguez held that no fundamental right to education
exists under the United States Constitution, no fundamental right to education
should exist under the Indiana Constitution.168
A preferable approach to determining a fundamental right to education
under the Indiana Constitution would require Indiana to break from the federal
model."6  Indiana would need to examine its constitution and independently
assess the existence of state fundamental rights."7  The use of the word
"duty" in Indiana's education clause, the unique language of the education
165. Sidie, 264 Ind. at 209-10, 341 N.E.2d at 766-67.
166. Defendant's Motion, supra note 141, at 28. See also infra note 171.
167. See, e.g., Gary Community Mental Health Center, Inc. v. Ind. Dept. of Pub. Welfare,
507 N.E.2d 1019, 1023 (Ind. App. 1987); Frame v. South Bend Community School Corp. 480
N.E.2d 261, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Sunshine Promotions, Inc. v. Ridlen, 483 N.E.2d 761, 765
n.9 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
168. Certain practical problems also exist in applying the "explicit/implicit" test to determine
fundamental rights, due to the inherent differences in state and federal constitutions. See supra notes
74-76 and accompanying text.
169. See Uner & Pitier, supra note 65 (arguing the value of going beyond the Federal model
and offering a method for building an independent constitutional argument). Indiana courts have
given some indication of a willingness to independently examine the state constitution, but now the
state seldom goes beyond the federal minimum and generally acquiesces in federal decisions. Id. at
640, 649. See also Baude, supra note 158, at 268-69 (Indiana is generally not one of the states to
go beyond the federal minimum, despite some precedence to show an independent scope to the state
constitution). See also Shepard, Second Wind for die Indiana Bill of Rights, 22 IND. L. REv. 575
(1989) (encouraging use of Indiana Constitution as source of rights and the state supreme court as
protector of rights).
170. See Utter & Pitier, supra note 65, at 654-58 (outlining methods for building constitutional
arguments, including looking at text of constitution and constitutional history and convention
debates). However, a constitutional interpretation should go beyond a strict historical interpretation.
"The larger principle contained in a constitutional guarantee should not be confined to what the
generation that adopted it was willing to live by". Id. at 659. But see Baude, supra note 158, at
266-68 (skepticism of "intent of the framers"). See also supra note 81 and accompanying text
(Other states have found independent fundamental rights to education in state constitutions.).
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clause,' and the intent of the framers can be used to argue for the existence
of a fundamental right to education in Indiana.72
The Indiana court may be reluctant to find a fundamental right to education
because such a finding could arguably open the door to the use of strict scrutiny
in school-related suits.'" The Indiana court may avoid finding a fundamental
right to education in order to preserve deference to school authorities on school
issues. 74 If the court fails to apply strict scrutiny, the court will apply the
rational-basis test and determine whether the funding formula is reasonably
related to the presumed purposes of the legislation. 75
Although aspects of the funding formula are quite vulnerable to the rational-
basis test, the rational-basis test may not adequately solve Indiana's funding
problems. 76 Because local control has been used to justify reliance on local
property taxes, 77 and because the funding formula's use of tax freezes clearly
171. The presence alone of the word "duty" in the Indiana Constitution is insufficient to
establish a fundamental right. For instance, Article 9, sec. 1 of the Indians Constitution contains
the word "duty" (duty to provide for the support of institutions for the deaf, dumb, blind and
insane), but an Indiana Court of Appeals held that the treatment of indigent mental patients is not
a fundamental right. Gary Community Mental Health Center v. Indiana Dept of Welfare, 507
N.E.2d 1019, 1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). The uniqueness of the education clause with its statement
of purpose must be stressed in order to distinguish the education clause from other clauses containing
the word "duty".
172. This approach would repeat the analysis used in the education clause argument, see infra
notes 191-241 and accompanying text. For an example of a state using an education clause to
support finding of a fundamental right to education, see Washakie Co., Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
Hershler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980). Additional arguments for finding of a fundamental right
to education include the treatment of education by Indiana's General Assembly in the Preamble to
Public Law 217 ("The citizens of Indiana have a fundamental interest in the development of
harmonious and cooperative relationships between school corporations and their certificated
employees:" 1973 Ind. Acts ch. 217, sec. I(a)) and the 1959 Reorganization Act. Supra note 112.
An independent approach would solve the problems posed by the Rodriguez "explicit/implicit" test,
by limiting fundamental rights to rights defined in the constitution by the word "duty" as well as by
specialized treatment. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. But see supra note 98; infra
note 229 (The education clause traditionally establishes the duty of the state, not the rights of the
individual).
173. Students attempting to question school board policy on issues as varied as discipline and
course selection could claim a fundamental right to education and require the court to apply strict
scrutiny. See Note, Academic or Disciplinary Decisions: When is Due Process Required? 6 U.
BRIDGEPORT L. REzv. 391, 405-18 (1985) (discussion of role of fundamental rights in student
disciplinary proceedings). See also supra note 77.
174. See supra note 77.
175. See supra notes 56-58, 167 and accompanying text. See Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp.,
273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980) (use of rational-basis analysis in Indians).
176. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text for limitations of equal protection argument.
177. See Defendant's Motion, supra note 141, at 33-36. ("The importance of local control over
local schools as a justification for local property taxes to support those schools has been recognized
in Indiana for over one hundred years." Id. at 33.).
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undermines local control,"7 arguably the funding formula is not reasonably
related to the legislative purpose of local control. The state, however, may be
able to devise a funding scheme that can survive rational-basis analysis and not
solve the deeper problems of the school funding crisis.'" 9 By doing away with
the tax freeze, the state could enhance local control and still provide inadequate
state foundation amounts."g If such "reform" required local districts to make
up the differences with local taxes, unequal educational opportunities would
persist. 1
8
Using the equal protection approach to challenge Indiana's funding formula
clearly presents problems. Finding a fundamental right to education will require
the court to go beyond federal models in order to interpret rights protected under
the Indiana equal protection clause. " If a fundamental right to education is
not found in the Indiana Constitution, the court will use the rational-basis
analysis, which may allow the state to make minor adjustments to a formula that
needs to be totally redrawn. 1
Even if successful, an equal protection challenge will not ensure that
funding levels will be adequately raised and that the issue of educational quality
will be addressed. The next section will analyze how an education clause
challenge can address both equality and adequacy problems.
B. The Education Clause Challenge
A close analysis of Indiana's education clause will reveal that the education
clause provides an effective basis on which to challenge Indiana's funding
formula. This section will interpret the education clause by looking at the
clause's language and history and will argue that the education clause directs the
General Assembly to provide for an educated citizenry with a uniform and
efficient system of education.
1. Interpreting Indiana's Education Clause
In order to provide the basis for a successful challenge to Indiana's funding
178. "here is no local control of school expenditures ... Schools are not free to chose their
level of expenditures, nor increase property taxes, nor do they have another source of local, optional
revenue." R. LENNEN & C. JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 53-54.
179. See supra note 86 and accompanying text for examples of state formulas surviving the
rational-basis standard.
180. Such a remedy would return Indiana back to the pre-1973 system. See supra notes 105-12
and accompanying text.
181. Id.
182. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
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formula, the Indiana Constitution's education clause must contain a mandate that
the Indiana General Assembly provide for an equal and adequate state system
of education.' An education mandate provides standards by which the court
can ascertain whether the General Assembly has fulfilled its obligation." If
the Indiana funding formula fails to meet the requirements of a constitutional
mandate, the court has the authority to step in and invalidate the funding
formula.'6
To interpret Indiana's education clause as containing a mandate, the
language and structure of Indiana's education clause must be analyzed. " The
education mandate must be found in the totality of the education clause and not
in a select number of terms."~ Interpretation must also take into account the
history of the clause, the intention of the framers and the interpretation of the
clause in subsequent Indiana cases. " Comparison with other states'
interpretations of education clauses are also useful in interpreting Indiana's
education mandate. '" By using these tools of interpretation, this note will
demonstrate that the education clause's directive to the Indiana General
Assembly to provide for an educated citizenry is a clear constitutional mandate
for equal and adequate educational opportunity.
a. Interpreting the Education Clause Through Language and Structure
In terms of language alone, the education clause can be interpreted as
mandating the General Assembly to provide for equal and adequate educational
opportunity. 9 ' The education clause reads:
184. See discussion of education clause challenges in other states, supra notes 90-104 and
accompanying text.
185. See supra note 92-93 and accompanying text.
186. If the General Assembly has failed to perform a specific constitutional mandate, the court
has the authority to step in. If not, the court will defer to the discretion of the General Assembly as
to how the state education system is supported. "The great and controlling duty of the courts, when
called upon to interpret the constitution, is to give effect to the intention of the people as expressed
in the instrument." Robinson v. Schenck, 102 Ind. 307, 308, 1 N.E. 698, 699 (1885). "[The
constitution] enjoins the general duty upon the Legislature, but leaves to them much discretion as
to the selection of means for the efficient performance of that duty;" Id. 102 Ind. at 318, 1 N.E. at
705. See also supra note 91 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 191-99 and accompanying text. See supra note 91 for general discussion
of methods of constitutional interpretation used in other states.
188. See infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 200-42 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 91, 97.
191. For an example of a state court analyzing the state constitutional mandate through the
language of the education clause, see Seattle School Dist. No. 1 of King City v. State, 90 Wash. 2d
476, 484, 490-95,585 P.2d 71, 84-85, 90-97 (1978) (state funding formula struck down as violating
Washington Constitution education clause).
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Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a
community, being essential to the preservation of a free government;
it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all
suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural
improvement; and to provide, by law, for a general and uniform
system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge,
and equally open to all."9
Indiana's education clause contains the word "duty," a term that appears
infrequently in the Indiana Constitution.' Significantly, "duty" in the
education clause is defined in terms of a specific statement of purpose:
"Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community, being
essential to the preservation of a free government." 94 This statement of
purpose cannot be ignored as mere verbiage because this statement of purpose
is unique in the constitution. No other clause elaborates in such a manner the
purposes for its existence.9 "
The education clause stands out in the Indiana Constitution as one of
paramount importance, emphatically defining the General Assembly's affirmative
duty as to education: because the state needs an educated citizenry, the General
Assembly must provide for a system of education." Furthermore, the system
of education must be general and uniform, free and equally open to all."9
192. IND. CONST. art. 8, sec. 1.
193. The uniqueness of wording was important in Seattle. "The duty to make 'ample provision'
[for a state system of education] is the only instance in which our constitution declares a specific
state function to be a 'paramount duty' of the State.... Undoubtedly, the imperative wording was
intentional." Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d at 484, 490, 585 P.2d at 85, 91. The word "duty" is found
elsewhere in the Indiana Constitution (for an example, see supra note 171), but the education clause
is the only place in the Indiana Constitution where the duty of the General Assembly is specified
with such elaboration. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
194. IND. CONST. art. 8, sec. 1.
195. Compare with Seattle School Dist. No. 1 of King City v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 484,
585 P.2d 71, 84-85 (1978) (court states that section of state education clause imposing duty to make
ample provision for state system of education is not mere preamble or policy declaration). See supra
notes 96-100 and accompanying text for discussion of importance of statements of purpose in state
education clauses.
196. The affirmative duty of the Indiana General Assembly is reiterated in subsequent Indiana
cases. See Robinson v. Schenck, 102 Ind. 307, 318, 1 N.E. 698, 705 (1974) ("The constitution
declares in very emphatic terms the duty of the legislature respecting common schools, and the
failure of that body to use all suitable means to build up and maintain the system would
unquestionably be a grave breach of duty;").
197. IND. CONST. art. 8, sec. 1.
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Implicit in the mandate is the requirement of efficiency; the means
employed must be adequate to the purposes of the education clause.'"
b. Interpreting the Education Clause Through History
The history of the education clause supports the interpretation of the clause
as creating an education mandate.' The education clause was original to the
1851 Constitution, but the origins of Indiana's education clause date back to the
1816 Indiana Constitution."' When the 1816 Indiana Constitution was
drafted, the introduction of the word "duty" in the education clause was
thoughtful and deliberate.' The 1816 Indiana Constitution established the
198. Although the word "efficient" is not found in the education clause, the convention debates
and later cases clearly indicate that the constitution requires an efficient system to provide for an
educated citizenry. See supra notes 208, 210, 213, 229, 231 for examples of use of the word
efficient as applied to Indiana education. See also 1959 Ind. Acts, ch. 202, sec. 1 (Reorganization
Act) "It is the sense of the Indiana General Assembly ... [t]hat the establishment and maintenance
of a general, uniform and efficient system of public schools is the traditional and current policy of
the State of Indiana."
199. The term "efficient" has been a critical factor in a number of other states' successful
challenges to state funding formulas. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc. 1989 Ky.
Lexis 55, 62, 76-77 ("The General Assembly is mandated, is duty bound, to create and maintain a
system of common schools ... The system of common schools must be efficient. ... [Efficient
schools must contain seven minimal characteristics, including equality and adequacy of educational
opportunity]."); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394, 395 (Trex. 1989)
("If the system is not 'efficient' or not 'suitable', the legislature has not discharged its constitutional
duty ... 'Efficient' conveys the meaning of effective or productive results and connotes the use of
resources so as to produce results ... capable of well producing the effect intended to be secured").
Both Kentucky's and Texas' education clauses include the word "efficient". Although Indiana's
clause does not contain the word "efficient", the importance of the word in Indiana's
constitutional history supports the position that "efficient" must be considered as part of Indiana's
constitutional requirement as well. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
200. For the use of history in the interpretation of a state education clause, see Edgewood, 777
S.W.2d at 394-96. The Indiana Supreme Court considers state constitutional debates as useful aides
for interpreting the Indiana Constitution. See In re Todd, 208 Ind. 168, 195-201, 193 N.E. 865,
875-78 (1935).
201. The 1816 Constitution coincided with Indiana's entry into statehood. The 1816
Constitution's education clause contained a lengthy statement of purpose and a designation of the
General Assembly's duties to apply funds and to pass laws calculated to encourage education (sec.
1). The clause also designated the duty of the General Assembly, as soon as circumstances
permitted, to provide for a general system of free education, graduating from township schools to
a state university (sec. 2). IND. CONST. art. IX (1816). The origins of the 1816 Indiana
Constitution go back to the Territorial Ordinance of 1787 which contained a rudimentary education
clause calling for the encouragement of education in non-specific terms. For a discussion of the
early history of education in Indiana, see R. BOONE, supra note 105; 2 R. BULEY, THE OLD
NORTHWEST 326-416 (1950).
202. Although neighboring state constitutions formed the bases for the rest of Indiana's 1816
constitution, the framers cleared new ground with the education clause. "In no part of its work did
the convention do so much constructive thinking or show more vision than in that part of the
constitution which dealt with education". 1 R. BuLEY, supra note 201, at 73. Article IX was
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duty of the general assembly to provide for a general system of education as
soon as circumstances permitted.'
The attention given to the education clause in the 1816 Constitution reflects
the recognition by early Indiana lawmakers of the value of education and its
utility in educating the populace in a frontier state. ' The future of a free
government, as well as the economic success of the new state, depended upon
education of all children, rich and poor. M
5
Although the 1816 Constitution recognized the state's duty to provide for
education, the Indiana General Assembly provided no corresponding state system
for education." The early state populace was mainly concerned with making
a living and had few resources to commit to education.' With no statewide
supervision, the early system of education was inefficient; schooling was
sporadic, lacked uniformity, and did little to develop an educated citizenry.'
comprehensive, specific and "entitled Indiana to the distinction of being the first (of neighboring
states) to recognize the duties of the State in the education of its citizens and to provide powers to
achieve this end." Id. The constitutional provision calling for free education for all children was
the expression of a pioneer people fifty years before schools were generally free in the East. R.
BOONE, supra note 105, at 12-15. Section two of the education clause calling for a general system
of education ascending in regular graduation from district schools to a state university was unique
in constitutional literature. Id. at 15.
203. Supra note 201.
204. For discussion of the utility of an educated populace, see supra notes 98-100 and
accompanying text.
205. Faith in the utility of education was expressed by Editor John B. Dillon of the Logansport
Canal Telegraph who wrote in 1836: "... If our union is still to continue, to cheer the hopes and
animate the efforts of the oppressed of every nation; if your fields are to be untrod by the hirelings
of despotism; if long days of blessedness are to attend our country in her career of glory; if you
would have the sun continue to shed his unclouded rays upon the face of freemen, then EDUCATE
ALL THE CHILDREN OF THE LAND." Quoted in 2 R. BULEY, supra note 201, at 416.
On the frontier, an educated person enjoyed a distinct advantage, a fact not ignored by
lawmakers. "If there be one feeling more powerful than another in the hearts of the millions of this
land, even through its remotest forests, it is that the intellectual cultivation which circumstances may
have denied them shall be secured to their children. They value, sometimes even beyond their
worth, the literary advantages by aid of which the few commonly distance their competitors in the
paths of emolument and honor". Id. at 329 (quoting Robert Dale Owen, speech in U.S. House of
Representatives, April 22, 1846). For discussion of Robert Dale Owen's role in Indiana schools,
see J. WALSH, supra note 159, at 141. But see R. BOONE, supra note 105, at 87 (not all Indiana
lawmakers were enthusiastic about education, and some were actually hostile to the idea of free
schools).
206. See R. BOONE, supra note 105, at 22-23.
207. Within 5 years of statehood, Indiana was in debt, trade was depressed, crops had been
poor and taxes were delinquent. The state was in no position to support education. Id. at 23.
208. Literacy levels in the state actually went down between 1840 and 1850, a great source of
embarrassment and concern for legislators. J. WALSH, supra note 159, at 141. "'I often hear my
fellow-citizens expressing their deep regret at the inefficient character of our common schools.'"
R. BOONE, supra note 105, at 92 (quoting from the Indiana State Journal, 1846).
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Educational opportunities were uneven and often lacking altogether.'
Lawmakers and early supporters of public education recognized the need
to create an efficient system that would uniformly and adequately prepare all
children for responsible citizenship." ° Calls for a general state system of
education stressed that the system must "guard especially against any distinction
between the rich and the poor".'" Delegates to the 1850 constitutional
convention, recognizing the inadequate state of education in Indiana," set out
to create an efficient system that would bring the benefits of education to all
children of the state.213
209. After statehood in 1816, schooling depended on local efforts. As a result, the length of
school terms and availability of textbooks differed, and arguments arose over accusations of
dishonesty of the local trustees squandering limited funds. 2 R. BULEY, supra note 201, at 361-63.
210. "In the prosecution of your labors of Constitutional revision ... [t]here is no portion of
constitutional revision more worthy of your careful consideration-noneinvolving more vital interests-
none more intimately connected with the highest welfare of the people ... than a constitutional
guarantee that wise and efficient provision shall be made for the proper education of the present and
future youth of Indiana." R. BOONE, supra note 105, at 131 (quoting from Fifth Annual Education
Message of Caleb Mills, 1849). For role of Mills in Indiana education, see Id. at 93-112.
211. R. BULEY, supra note 201, at 362 (quoting 1821 instructions to committee to prepare bill
for general state system of education).
212. "We have no system, no uniformity of action, no well directed general effort on the great
subject of education." REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE
REVISION OF THE CONsTrrTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1859 (1850 & photo. reprint 1935)
[hereinafter DEBATES] (quoting Delegate Read). The sorry state of education in Indiana between
1816 and 1851 was pointed out by a number of the legislators during the state constitutional
convention who referred to Indiana's high illiteracy rate. "In 1840, by the census then taken, this
State, ... was clearly proven to be the most ignorant of all the free States, and far, very far behind
many of the slave States.... If posterity does not look upon us with surprise and indignation, it will
be because by our own neglect we have plunged them so deeply in ignorance, that they cannot
appreciate the duty which belonged to us, and which we have not discharged." Id. at 1890-91
(quoting Delegate Bryant).
213. See DEBATES, supra note 212, at 1858, 1861, 1868, 1892. "We are, sir, laying broader
our political foundations. We are giving the election of all the officers of government ... not to a
select portion of the people - but directly to the whole people themselves. The education of every
child in the State has become simply a political necessity. It is a necessary measure of defense and
self-preservation. We must-yes, sir, I repeat it, we must have a better devised and more efficient
system of general education." (Delegate Read); "The standard of education in these institutions,
does not correspond with the spirit and improvements of the age ... Every gentlemen must be aware,
that our common school system has not answered the purpose for which it was devised. The truth
is, we have no uniform system ... If we wish to have a system that will be general, uniform and
efficient, we must have an officer, whose special business it will be to direct, control and guide that
system." (Delegate Morrison discussing the illiteracy rate in Indiana and calling
for state superintendent of schools); The cause of common schools is "one of the strongest
safeguards of human freedom; we should encourage it by every legitimate means in our possession."
(Delegate Allen stressing role of education in the safety of free institutions and permanence and
security of society). "[The State must provide a uniform school system] that all may reap the
advantages in an equal degree." (Delegate Hawkins); For opposition to education clause, see R.
BOONE, supra note 105, at 135.
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The changes made in the Indiana Constitution of 1851 reflected those
concerns. To remedy the wide disparities in educational opportunity throughout
the state, the delegates added the words "general and uniform". 24 To further
ensure uniformity, they established the common school fund and the position of
state superintendent of schools." 5 To hasten the formation of a state education
system, they excised the words "as soon as circumstances permit".216
Although the 1851 Constitution mandated the General Assembly to provide
for an educated citizenry with a uniform system of education, the General
Assembly did not support local school districts with adequate funds.217 An
1852 statute empowered local districts to levy local taxes in order to supplement
the inadequate state revenue."' In 1854 however, in Greencastle v. Black, the
Indiana Supreme Court struck down this 1852 statute as violative of the Indiana
Constitution. 219 The Greencastle court was concerned that local taxation was
a retreat from the constitutional commitment to a general and uniform system
of education and a return to the pre-1851 fragmented and inefficient system.20
By focusing on the term "uniform", however, the Indiana Supreme Court
in Greencastle ignored the larger purposes of the education clause." By
narrowly interpreting the constitutional mandate in terms of the isolated word
"uniform" instead of the meaning of the clause in its entirety, the court limited
revenues available for education and, in fact, defeated the goal of efficiently
providing for an educated citizenry.'
214. For a discussion of the terms "general and uniform" see infra notes 232-39 and
accompanying text.
215. See R. BOONE, supra note 105, at 138, 164-80.
216. Drafters of the 1851 Constitution kept only as much of the 1816 Constitution as applicable
to the new system. See DEBATES, supra note 212, at 1858.
217. See C. KE'rLEBOROUGH, supra note 159, at cl-cliii.
218. Section 130, c. 98, I.R.S., 1852. See R. BOONE, supra note 105, at 152-54. See also
KETTLEBOROUGH, supra note 159, at cl.
219. 5 Ind. 557 (1854).
220. Historically, lack of uniformity had created problems of inefficiency, confusion and waste.
The court was concerned with avoiding the mistakes of the past that had denied Indiana children
equal means to education, thus the court strictly construed the uniformity requirement. Greencastle,
5 Ind. at 561, 563.
221. "[Ihf the provisions of section 130 are to be regarded as constitutional, the uniformity of
the common school system would be at once destroyed.... But the want of uniformity would not
be the only-evil resulting ... as the power of controlling schools would necessarily, to a great extent,
pass from the state and the superintendent into the hands of the local authorities ... [Thus all the
evils of the old system which were intended to be avoided by the new constitution ... would be the
inevitable result." Id. at 564.
222. Greencastle township had attempted to raise the tax to continue the school term after public
funds had been exhausted. Id. at 558. The Greencastle holding prohibited the township from going
beyond the minimum revenue provided by state funds. R. BOONE, supra note 105, at 156. As a
result of the Greencastle decision, the school term in Indiana was shortened to two and a half
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The public, however, immediately recognized the short-sightedness of the
court. As the Indianapolis Journal noted in an 1858 editorial, the decision
"prevents the passage of a proper and efficient school law, as it razes everything
down to a foolish and ridiculous uniformity."223
The demands for an efficient system of education eventually outweighed
Greencastle's narrow interpretation of the constitutional requirements of
uniformity.' In 1867, the General Assembly again passed a measure
enabling local school districts to levy local taxes.' This statute remained
unchallenged' until 1885 when the Indiana Supreme Court in Robinson v.
Schenck upheld the revenue statute as constitutional and overruled the earlier
Greencastle decision.' Stressing the necessity of an efficient system of
public education, the supreme court in Robinson established a more flexible
interpretation of "uniform" that allowed local taxation.'
As seen through the history of the education clause, the primary purpose
of the clause is to provide for an educated citizenry. 9  The educational
months, many schools were closed and underpaid teachers left the profession. Id.
223. The editorial continued: Because of Greencastle, children were "'growing up in
ignorance.'" The only solution was to "'make a bold and prompt move to wipe out the barbarous
and ridiculous Constitution which fetters our legislation on this subject!'" Quoted in
KErLEBOROUGH, supra note 159, at cli.
224. Over the next 12 years various attempts were made to amend the Indiana constitution to
remove the restriction that prohibited local school districts from providing additional revenue to
support local schools. However, fear that removing the words "general and uniform" from the
constitution would allow a return disorder of pre-1851 prevented the passage of the amendment.
See KgrrLEBOROUGH, supra note 159, at cli-cliii.
225. See R. BOONE, supra note 105, at 233-35.
226. "When the General Assembly convened in 1869, the constitutionality of this act had not
been tested, but Governor Baker informed the legislature that in every locality where the tax had
been levied 'the people seem to have acquiesced in the law under which it was imposed as a
constitutional exercise of the taxing power' and he thought that if this acquiescence should continue
the schools would be tolerably well provided for." KirrLEBoROUGH, supra note 159, at cliii.
227. 102 Ind. 307, 1 N.E. 698 (1885). See R. BOONE, supra note 105, at 235-37.
228. "A system which grants to all the various subdivisions of the state equal and uniform
rights and privileges, leaving only to the local authorities the right to govern the local affairs, is a
general and uniform system.... The fact that there is a difference in the methods of local
government does not prove that the system is not a general and uniform one.... Where there is no
discrimination made in favor of one subdivision and against others, there is [no] want of
uniformity." Robinson, 102 Ind. at 312-13, 1 N.E. at 701-02.
229. See supra notes 99, 204-05, 213 and accompanying text. This purpose is reiterated in
Indiana case law. State v. McLellan, 138 Ind. 395, 409, 37 N.E. 799, 804 (1894) "[lt is instruction
and culture of the mind that form the great object to be attained, the better to fit and prepare the
children of the state to discharge the duties and responsibilities of manhood and womanhood and
citizenship of this great commonwealth." School City of Terre Haute v. Harrison SchoolTownship,
184 Ind. 742, 747, 112 N.E. 514, 516 (1916) ("The state in its sovereign capacity has a direct
interest in the enlightenment and mental development of its citizens, to the end that free popular
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system devised to meet this purpose must be uniform, providing equal
educational opportunity to all Indiana children.' The system must also be
efficient; the state education system must effectively and adequately achieve the
results of an educated citizenry.' The education mandate of the Indiana
Constitution, therefore, is that the Indiana General Assembly must provide equal
and adequate educational opportunity to all Indiana children. A challenge to
Indiana's funding formula should be based squarely on this interpretation of the
education clause.
2. Challenging Indiana's Funding Formula: A Proposal
An education clause challenge to Indiana's funding formula should take full
advantage of the clause's potential to provide for equal and adequate educational
opportunity. Despite the potential effectiveness of an education clause challenge
based on the entirety of the clause, the phrase "general and uniform" has often
been the focus of education clause challenges. 2  Such a focus presents
problems. 3  Indiana courts have determined that "general and uniform" does
not mean that local public school systems must be identical" and that reliance
on local taxes to supplement state funds is a constitutional approach to school
funding. 5  As long as the funding system as a whole is uniformly applied,
funding disparities among school districts do not result in an unconstitutional
system.' Even if the court uses the uniformity phrase to directly address
government may be preserved and may attain its highest efficiency.... The school children are
incidentally benefited; but the primary purpose of the state ... is to develop and secure to the state
a moral, intellectual, and enlightened citizenship."). See supra note 98.
230. See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text. Equal educational opportunity does not
necessitate exact equality of funding. See supra note 19. Uniformity is not a goal in itself;
uniformity is a means to an end. Only if all children are uniformly provided with educational
opportunities can the goal of an educated citizenry be achieved. See supra note 213.
231. See supra notes 198-99 for discussion of efficiency. See also Lafayette v. Jenners, 10 Ind.
70, 76 (1857) (discussing need to maintain efficiency as well as uniformity of general education
system); Robinson v. Schenck, 102 Ind. 307, 308, 1 N.E. 698, 699 (1885) ("The prime object
sought is the creation of a system that shall be efficient and enduring."); Clark v. Haworth, 122 Ind.
462, 471, 23 N.E. 946, 949 (1890) (need to preserve usefulness and efficiency of system).
232. See Jensen v. State, supra note 147, at 2 ("The complaint alleges that the State, under
Article 8, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution, is responsible for 'maintaining a uniform system of
free public elementary and secondary schools"); Complaint, supra note 150, at 8 ("The plaintiff
students and other Indiana public school children have a guaranteed constitutional right to a general
and uniform system of education.").
233. The uniformity argument becomes a surrogate for an equal protection clause argument-and
suffers similar limitations. See supra notes 85-87, 176-81 and accompanying text.
234. See Robinson v. Schenck, 102 Ind. 307, 313, 1 N.E. 698,702 (1885) ("The fact that there
is a difference in the methods of local government does not prove that the system is not a general
and uniform one.").
235. Id. at 310-11, 1 N.E. at 700.
236. Id. at 313, 1 N.E. at 701-02.
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problems of unequal educational opportunity, the court may only require
uniformity of bare minimal educational requirements. 237
In order to avoid these limitations, the phrase "general and uniform" must
be seen within the context of the entire education clause, as a restriction on the
General Assembly's discretion23 as how to meet the goal of an educated
citizenry.' By focusing on the goal of an educated citizenry, an education
clause challenge can give the court the constitutional basis on which to assess
both the equality and the adequacy of educational opportunity in the state.'
This ability to address educational adequacy is a critical advantage, since
inadequacy of educational opportunity may well be a more glaring problem than
inequality.
24
A challenge to Indiana's funding formula based squarely on the entirety of
the education clause would require the court to define Indiana's constitutional
mandate for education' in terms of the over-riding purpose of the education
clause, an educated citizenry. 3 As this note has demonstrated, the court then
must conclude that the education mandate of the Indiana Constitution is that the
General Assembly provide for an educated citizenry with equal and adequate
education for all Indiana children.2'
The court then would be able to define standards to measure whether the
General Assembly has satisfied this mandate.' 5 The court first would define
what constitutes an educated citizenry.' The court further would establish
237. See supra note 86. In early Indiana, equal education under the education clause referred
only to equal lengths of school terms for all schools. An equality argument under the education
clause must stress the ability of the constitution to change with the times. See Edgewood Indep.
School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1989) ("We seek [the education clause's]
meaning with the understanding that the Constitution was ratified to function as an organic document
to govern society and institutions as they evolve through time").
238. See Robinson, 102 Ind. at 318, 1 N.E. at 705 ("There is this limitation on the legislative
power: the system must be 'a general and uniform one,").
239. Uniformity is to be valued as long as it furthers the mandate of an educated citizenry. The
primary goal of the education clause is to provide for an educated citizenry; everything else,
including equal educational opportunity is a means to this end. See supra notes 229-31 and
accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text. The court should have no problem with
the connection between funding levels and educational equality or quality. See supra notes 46, 138-
46 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 140.
242. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. See also supra note 99 for a discussion of
need for and requirements of an educated citizenry.
244. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 99, at 243.
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standards to judge the means by which the General Assembly has attempted to
satisfy the mandate.' As this note has shown, the standards must include
uniformity and efficiency; the education system must uniformly and efficiently
prepare Indiana children for citizenship.'
Based on these standards, the court then would assess the current funding
formula. Regardless of the specific standards the court might employ, the
current Indiana funding formula is unlikely to survive a challenge under
Indiana's education clause. Clearly, an educational system that results in student
performance lagging behind the national average does not efficiently prepare its
children for citizenship.'9 A funding scheme that results in a wide
differentiation of money spent per pupil, with the quality of school often
depending on geographic accident, is not uniform.'50
The court should strike down the current system as failing to provide equal
and adequate educational opportunity, and direct the General Assembly to design
a new funding formula that would recognize the state's duty to provide for an
educated citizenry." The constitutional standards established by the court
247. The standards set by the Court can range from the minimal standard set by the New Jersey
court in Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 519, 303 A.2d 273, 297, supp. op. 63 N.J. 196, 306
A.2d 65, cert. denied, sub nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973), and on reh 'g Robinson
v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713, cert. denied, sub nom. Klein v. Robinson, 423 U.S. 913
(1975) (defining constitutional mandate as thorough and efficient system of schools and leaving
content of constitutionally mandated educational opportunity up to state), to the more elaborate
standards set by states such as Kentucky & West Virginia which defined specific elements of a
constitutional school system. See e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 1989 Ky. Lexis 55,
72-77; Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 688, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (1979). See also supra note
93.
248. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
251. A number of proposals exist for revising the state's funding formula. See R. LEHNEN &
C. JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 82-94. See also Task Force, supra note 130.
The Indiana General Assemble will be faced with the problem of revising the funding formula
to provide both equal and adequate educational opportunity as mandated by the Indiana Constitution.
As this note has discussed, strict equality of funding may not translate into equal or adequate
educational opportunity. See supra notes 19, 86-87 and accompanying text. A number of funding
approaches are possible ranging from full state funding to a combination of state and local funding
with equalization factors and revenue caps. For a discussion of different approaches to funding
reform, see Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, Cause. No. 362, 516 (Dist. Ct., Sept. 24, 1990)
(declaring Texas school funding system remains unconstitutional despite efforts of legislature to
reform system after 1989 Texas Supreme Court decision. This opinion outlines various funding
approaches and discusses shortcomings of such approaches in terms of equity and adequacy).
In Indiana, the Task Force on Financing Public Education has recommended to the State
Superintendent of Education that the Indiana funding formula should provide a substantially higher
minimum guaranteed amount per-pupil than currently guaranteed (from combined state and
"equalized" local funds) and that local districts should be allowed to exceed that minimum amount
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would provide guidelines for the General Assembly's subsequent efforts. The
constitutional standards of uniformity and efficiency would require the state to
fund public education at a level sufficient to provide adequate educational
opportunities to all students. 2  The revenue distributed by the state would
differ from district to district because of differences in local costs and the needs
of different student populations, but the state revenue would be required to
produce parity of educational opportunity. If students received an adequate level
of educational opportunity from state funds, students would no longer be at the
mercy of local economic conditions.53 All Indiana children would have equal
opportunity to adequately prepare for their futures.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although local schools are often under fire for poor student performance
and students unprepared to take their places as productive members of society,
the responsibility for public education is a state responsibility. The local school
district's ability to reduce class size, to hire more counselors, to provide
remedial classes, or to purchase computers often depends on the state's funding
scheme for public education. In Indiana, the inequalities and inadequacies of
educational opportunity are a direct result of a restrictive funding scheme and
an under-funded system of public education.
Other states' funding formulas have been successfully challenged under
state constitution education clauses. In the last year alone, Montana, Kentucky,
and Texas Supreme Courts have forced state legislatures to devise new funding
with local funds. Task Force, supra note 130, at 11. The political considerations of any particular
funding scheme and the technical problems of measuring equality and adequacy are beyond the scope
of this note.
252. A revised formula would not necessarily do away with all local taxes. Local districts
could be allowed to raise additional revenue to provide for special programs and services, as long
as the state adequately provides for student needs. The key restriction is that the system must be
efficient. In Robinson v. Schenck, the court permitted the legislature to provide for schools through
local taxation because such a method would promote an efficient system of education. See supra note
227-28 and accompanying text. "The prime object sought is the creation of a system that shall be
efficient and enduring." Robinson v. Schenck, 102 Ind. 307, 308, 1 N.E. 698, 699 (1885). Local
taxes should be used only as long as they further the purposes of an efficient system.
253. Altering the present system would not necessarily destroy local control. In fact, with
increased local revenue, local control may well be enhanced. See Edgewood Indep. School Dist.
v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 1989) ("Some have argued that reform in school finance will
eliminate local control, but this argument has no merit.... only if alternatives are indeed available
can a community exercise the control of making choices.") See supra notes 60-61. Local control,
often presented as a goal of the state's education system must be seen as yet another means to
achieve an efficient system of education. For background on role of local control in Indiana, See
Clark v. Haworth, 122 Ind. 462, 465, 23 N.E. 946, 947-48 (1890); Robinson, 102 Ind. at 309, 1
N.E. at 699-01.
Van Ess: Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., Caveat Advocatus, The Growing Im
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1991
310 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25
schemes to better serve the needs of students. Indiana has the same opportunity
to strike down the Indiana funding formula and to initiate meaningful school
funding reform.
Indiana must take advantage of this opportunity to confront the full range
of problems created by the current funding formula. By using the entirety of the
education clause and not its isolated terms, the Indiana court can address both
problems of unequal and inadequate state educational opportunity. By focusing
on the purpose of the education clause to provide for an educated citizenry, the
court can establish standards by which to judge the failures of the current system
and to guide the future efforts of the Indiana General Assembly.
If the court interprets the Indiana Constitution as mandating equal and
adequate educational opportunity, the efforts of the framers of the education
clause will at last bear fruit. Indiana will have a uniform and efficient system
of education that will prepare all children to take their places in society and will
secure to the state the advantages of an educated citizenry.
MARILYN R. HOLSCHER
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